It seeks to build an infrastructure for regional water hegemony, positioning it, at the very least, in such a way that it can exchange water for oil. In: Yihdego, Z. et al. Initially opposed to the GERD, Sudan later expressed support for its construction in 2013, claiming that it would serve the interests of all three nations (Maguid, 2017). In the absence of the application of the Watercourses Convention, various other legal arrangements and political declarations must be considered to gain an understanding of the regulation of the Dam and the Nile River more generally. (2012). Although Egypt has persistently argued that the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan is the legal framework for the allocation of the waters of the Nile, Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states reject that argument. Egypt had asked the UNSC to push the three countries to adhere to their obligations in accordance with the rules of international law in order to reach a fair and balanced solution to the issue of the GERD. Egypts repeated references to the rules of international law is part of an effort to maintain its so-called natural and historical rights that were established and reaffirmed by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan, respectivelytreaties many of the other involved parties reject as anachronistic and untenable. For nearly a century, as a legacy of colonialism, Egypt enjoyed what Tekuya referred to as a hydro-hegemony over the Nile; despite Ethiopia contributing 86% to its waters. The GERD has become a new reality challenging the traditional dynamics in the Nile River Basin. Ethiopia, with a population of more than 115 million people and Projected to be 230 million by 2050. The New Arab (2020a). Mainly, for the downstream countries, the. Still, Egypt may be playing with fire if it were to press the legal significance of the DoP. The various warnings by experts about the dangers of the new Ethiopian dam have begun to cause panic among Egyptians, to the point of belief that the Aswan Dam will collapse once the Renaissance is completed. Von Lossow, T. & Roll, S. (2015). The official narrative is that Ethiopia can uproot poverty and bring about a definitive end to social and economic underdevelopment by means of the construction of a series of mega-dams combined with the development of the national energy infrastructure. A regional framework for the management of the Nile already existsthe Nile Basin Initiative mentioned abovewhich is a partnership among the Nile riparian states that was launched in 1999. For example, Ethiopians and Egyptians are more likely to understand and appreciate the challenges that they face, particularly in the areas of water security, climate change, food production, and poverty alleviation, if they regularly interact with each other and engage in more bottom-up, participatory and inclusive approaches to the resolution of their conflicts. The countrys 2003 development plan introduced many more, and the Ethiopian government launched an ambitious PR campaign to encourage donor nations and international funding agencies to support these projects financially and ideologically as the highway to Ethiopian development and prosperity. Such a mitigation program can make it much easier for Egyptian and Sudanese authorities to cooperate with Ethiopia and the other riparians in creating and adopting an agreement for management of the Nile. Success on this endeavor will only occur under a legally binding regime that ensures mutually beneficial rights. At the same. The above-mentioned Gilgel Gibe III Dam stood out as the worlds most controversial dam until the GERD. Sudans agricultural and hydropower interests align with those of Ethiopia while it has a strong interest in not alienating its 'big brother' and northern neighbour, Egypt, with whom it shares a long and partly contested border (Whittington et al., 2014). The most important of these treaties is the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (the Watercourses Convention). In the modern era, the US used water to blackmail Egypt. Although Ethiopia has argued that the hydroelectric GERD will not significantly affect the flow of water into the Nile, Egypt, which depends almost entirely on the Nile waters for household and commercial uses, sees the dam as a major threat to its water security. Since then, there has been a constant stream of complaints regarding the social and environmental impacts on downriver areas, including large displacements of local populations. But controversy has surrounded the project ever since it was announced in 2011 especially concerning its . when did construction of the dam begin? Tawfik, Rawia Discussion Paper 5/2015 . Learn. Ultimately, however, Egypt did not sign the CFA (nor did Sudan) hence it does not resolve the dispute. "The Israeli installation of the missile system around the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam was completed after the Israeli work began in May 2019, considering that it is the first Israeli air defense system abroad that can launch (two types of missiles), the first with a range of 5 km, and the second with a range of 50 kilometer". Article IV of the DoP provides that the parties shall utilize their shared water resources in their respective territories in an equitable and reasonable manner and Article III provides that the parties shall take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm in utilizing the Blue/Main Nile. Ethiopia can make a strong case that the operation of the Dam complies with each principle. We do know that Ethiopia is already seeing longer droughts and worse floods. Similarly, both the final agreement between the riparian states for the allocation of the water and resources of the Nile should include a dispute resolution mechanism. Egypts main argument might be that, despite being unsatisfactory and anachronistic, the Nile Waters Treaties remain good law and are enforceable against the respective parties. Subsequent impact studies were performed by the European Investment Bank and the African Development Bank, and in the light of the results, these banks cancelled their funding for Gibe III. In the relatively unlikely scenario that the above points failed, Ethiopia could argue that there has been such a change of circumstances since the Nile Waters Treaties were concluded that they ought to be terminated. This represents a new challenge to the basins current hydro-political regime and status quo, as it may drive Sudans interest in renegotiating its current quota(Link et al., 2012;Whittington et al., 2014). Ethiopias dam-construction strategy threatens not only Kenyas water-resource development efforts but also Somalias water security, as is evidenced by Ethiopias development plans for the Jubba and Shebelle Rivers. Test. The 6,000-megawatt Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, shown here in May 2016, is scheduled to begin producing electricity in 2017. Today, however, Ethiopia is building the Grand Renaissance Dam and, with it, Ethiopia will physically control the Blue Nile Gorgethe primary source of most of the Nile waters. The Nile riparians must understand that the river is a common resource whose effective management must be approached from a basin-wide perspective. Cairo - U.S. Special Envoy to the Horn of Africa Ambassador Mike Hammer met with senior Egyptian government officials on July 25 to advance a diplomatic resolution on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) that supports the water needs, economy, and livelihood of all Egyptians, Sudanese, and Ethiopians. Gebreluel, G. (2014). Concern has focused in particular on Lake Turkana, which derives 90 per cent of its water from the Omo River on which the Gilgel Gibe III Dam was built. Sima Aldardari. The Nile is not a boundary-delimiting river, hence Ethiopia would almost certainly argue that the exception should not be applied here. 74 cubic metres. In terms of the current status of talks, in 2019, US Secretary of the Treasury Steven Mnuchin began facilitating negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia which led to some tentative progress. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and hydroelectric project is located 700 km northeast of the capital city Addis Abeba, in the Benishangul--Gumaz region of Ethiopia, along the Blue Nile River. There has long been a conflict over water rights among the riparian countries of the Eastern Nile Basin (Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia). The Danger of Multi-Party Democracy and Free Elections in Plural Societies Recognizing the Muslim Brotherhood as a Legitimate Player in Egyptian Politics was a Big Mistake Ethiopian Partnering with ASKY to Establish West African Cargo Hub Ethiopia and China's ZTE singed $800 million mobile deal H and M to build factories in Ethiopia Third, Egypt should abandon continued references to its so-called natural historical rights (i.e., the water rights granted Egypt by the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and the 1959 Agreement between Egypt and Sudan). On Foes and Flows: Vulnerabilities, Adaptive Capacities and Transboundary Relations in the Nile River Basin in Times of Climate Change. l Coordinates 111255N 3505 . It is clearly a philosophy that looks beyond the electricity and freshwater needs of local communities to a geo-strategic restructuring of the Horn of Africa. Although the immediate issue at stakesecuring a technical agreement on the filling of the GERDs reservoiris among Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan, the broader and longer-term goal should be for all 11 statesincluding Tanzania, Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Eritrea, and South Sudanto agree on a legal regime for the management of this important watercourse. In 2019, the UNESCO World Heritage Committee warned that the Gibe III Dam had already disrupted the seasonal patterns of Lake Turkana and that this would reduce fish life and harm local communities dependent on the Lake. Some have mythified it and claim it is the Gihon River of the Biblical Book of Genesis that encircles the entire land of Cush, thereby adding a religious dimension to the politicisation. Water scarcity is a growing problem. All three countries have a vested interest in a properly operated dam. At stake, too, is . 67K views 6 months ago ETIOPIA The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, on the Blue Nile, is located around 14 km upstream of the Ethiopian-Sudan Border, at around 700 km from the Capital. 4. Ethiopias strategy for dam construction goes far beyond developmental goals. (2014). The current filling which is ongoing since early July 2021 has presented no issues as well. Lastly, over-year storage facilities upstream in Ethiopia will allow Sudan to increase its water use. (2017). Test. Learn. That seems unlikely given that the DoP concerns the Dam alone and was agreed only between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan; whereas the Nile Waters Treaties concern the whole Nile Basin and involve many more states. The Ethiopian government is spending $4.7 billion to construct the 1,780-meter dam across the Blue Nile. According to present plans, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) now under construction across the Blue Nile River in Ethiopia will be the largest hydroelectric dam in Africa, and one of the 12 largest in the world. These parallel developments appear to be elements of a bigger hydro-political strategy wherein the riparian countries aim to increase their water utilisation to put facts on the ground (and underpin legal claims based on those uses) and increase their bargaining position for renegotiations of volumetric water allocations. Ethiopias interests in developing its water resources are driven by its growing population and high demand for socio-economic development (Gebreluel, 2014). Salman, S.M.A. The Watercourses Convention aims to regulate the uses, as well as the conservation, of all transboundary waters above and below the surface. Since 2015, technical reports on the potential impacts of the dam have failed to reach a consensus within the TNC (Maguid, 2017). Despite the intense disagreements, though, Ethiopia continues to move forward with the dam, arguing that the hydroelectric project will significantly improve livelihoods in the region more broadly. The three fillings hitherto, with the most recent in August 2022, imposed no discernible harm on downstream states. The Chinese-financed Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), despite a recent breakdown in talks on Africa's largest development project, risks powering up a range of downstream tensions and rivalries. The Ethiopian government has always availed itself of its power to transfer local populations off land it decides to declare a public resource. This is hardly a revelation, as this strategy has long been foremost in the minds of the ruling elites in Addis Ababa and supported by the international powers. grand ethiopian renaissance dam. Both Egypt and Ethiopia could make arguments in support of their positions. A political requirement will be to agree on rules for filling the GERD reservoir and on operating rules for the GERD, especially during periods of drought. The dam will flood 1,680 square kilometers of forest in northwest Ethiopia (an area about four times the size of Cairo), displace approximately 20,000 people in Ethiopia, and create a reservoir that will hold around 70 billion cubic . The strategy and its surrounding narrative have attracted large influxes of foreign investment in the Ethiopian agrarian sector, with multi-million dollar leases of agricultural land to foreigners generally linked to irrigation projects planned in tandem with the construction of the dam. Maguid, M.A. The withdrawal from the project by Deltares has been met by a wave of objections in Egypt for fear . But the Ethiopian elites show little interest in addressing such concerns, bent as they are on a nationalist revivalist project that claims an Ethiopian exceptionalism that places Addis Ababa above international law as it pursues a water-management strategy that has less to do with its development aims than with its ambitions to weaponise water in a bid for regional hegemony.
Information Technology Manager